Abstract-In a secondary spectrum market primaries set prices for their unused channels to the secondaries. The payoff of a primary depends on the channel state information (CSI) of its competitors. We consider a model where a primary can acquire its competitors CSI at a cost. We formulate a game between two primaries where each primary decides whether to acquire its competitor's CSI or not and then selects its price based on that. Our result shows that no primary decide to acquire its competitor's CSI with an absolute certainty. When the cost of acquiring the CSI is above a threshold, there is a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) where both the primaries remain uninformed of their respective competitor's CSI. When the cost is below the threshold, in the unique NE each primary randomizes between its decision to acquire the CSI or not. Our result reveals that irrespective of the cost of acquiring the CSI, the expected payoff of a primary remains the same.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secondary access of the spectrum where license holders (primaries) allow unlicensed users (secondaries) to use their channels can enhance the efficiency of the spectrum usage. However, secondary access will only proliferate when it is rendered profitable to the primaries. We investigate a secondary spectrum market where there are two primaries which want to lease their unused channels to a secondary in lieu of financial remuneration. The secondary seeks to buy a channel with the lowest price.
The transmission rate offered by the channel of a primary evolves randomly because of the fading and the usage statistics of the consumers of the primary. If the transmission rate is below a certain threshold, then the secondary will not buy that channel and the channel is unavailable for sale. When its channel is available, the profit or payoff that a primary can obtain will depend in part on if the other primary also has a channel available. Acquiring such an information may be costly as, for example it might require the primary to sense the other primary's spectrum and analyze its traffic patterns. Perceiving how this cost impacts the competition between the primaries is the goal of this paper.
We investigate a setting where each primary decides whether to acquire the channel state information (CSI) of its competitor before selecting a price for its available channel. However, while taking its own decision a primary does not know whether its competitor decides to acquire the CSI or not. Knowledge of the CSI of the other primary has potential advantages. For example, if the primary knows that the channel of its competitor is not available, then, it can select the highest possible price and still can sell its channel because of the Arnob Ghosh and Saswati Sarkar are supported by NSF CNS 1525457. Randall Berry is supported in part by NSF grant AST-1343381. lack of competition. However, acquiring this knowledge will make the primary incur a cost, which reduces its profit. On the other hand, it is also not apriori clear whether neither of the primaries acquire the CSI of their competitors. This is because one primary may acquire the CSI of its competitor and take advantage of extra information compared to its competitor.
The inherent uncertainty in the competitor's decision also complicates the pricing strategy of the primary. If one primary (A) knows that the channel of the other primary (B) is available, its pricing decision still depends on if primary B also know that its channel is available; if not then the primary B may randomize among multiple prices, enabling primary A to charge a higher price. On the other hand, if the primary does not know the channel state of its competitor, then it needs to select a lower price which will increase the probability of selling, but fetches a lower payoff in the event of a sale.Thus, it is also not apriori clear how a primary will select its price.
Price competition in economics and cognitive radio network has been extensively studied [1] , [2] ; however, most of the models do not capture this type of uncertainty about the supply that the sellers will bring to the market. Some recent papers [3] - [6] considered price competition models where a player may not be able to sell its channel. However, the above papers imposed a constraint where the players can not know the channel states of their competitors. Thus, the decision of acquiring the CSI of other primary is not a part of the strategy space. In our setting, the decision to acquire the CSI of the other primary is included in the primary's strategy space along with the prices. Thus, in our setting a primary is also unaware whether its CSI is known to the other primary or not, while in [3] - [6] the primary knows that its CSI is unknown to other primary. Thus, a primary now needs to judiciously decide whether to acquire the CSI of its competitor or not and selects a price based on that. We contribute in this space.
We model the setting as a non-cooperative game with the primaries as players. When the channel of a primary is available, it decides i) whether to acquire the CSI of its competitor or not, and ii) a price. Selection of the price depends on the information the primary has. Specifically, if the primary acquires the CSI of its competitor it may select different prices depending on whether its competitor's channel is available or not, on the other hand, when the primary does not acquire the CSI of competitor, it has to select a price irrespective of the competitor's channel state.
We completely characterize the NE strategy profile. Our result reveals that there is no NE strategy where a primary decides to know the CSI of its competitor with probability 1 (Theorems 1 and 2). Our result also reveals that if the cost of acquiring the CSI of its competitor is above a threshold (T , say), then there exists a unique NE where both primaries decide not to acquire the CSI of their respective competitor (Theorem 3). In the NE strategy, both players select prices from identical continuous distribution.
We also show that when the cost of acquiring the information of the competitor's channel is below the threshold T , then there exists a unique NE where both the primaries select statistically identical mixed strategies (Theorem 4). More specifically, in this NE, each primary chooses to acquire (not acquire, resp.) the information of its competitor's channel w.p. p (1 − p resp.).We also show that p increases as the cost decreases and thus, the primary is more likely to acquire the information of its competitor's channel as the cost decreases. Intuitively, when a primary knows (does not know, resp.) the channel of its competitor is available, a primary should select prices more conservatively (aggressively, resp.). Our result validates the above intuition and goes beyond. We show that when the primary knows (does not know, resp.) that its competitor's channel is available then it randomizes among the prices in the interval [p 1 ,p 2 ] ([p 2 ,p 3 ], resp.). We have also fully characterizedp 1 ,p 2 , andp 3 .
Our analysis also shows an apparently counter-intuitive result-the expected payoff of a primary is the same irrespective of the cost of acquiring the CSI (Theorems 3 and 4).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a secondary spectrum market with two primaries (players) and one secondary. Each primary has a channel that is available with probability (w.p.) q, where 1 > q > 0 and q is of common knowledge.
The secondary does not buy an available channel which is priced above v. If the channels of both the primaries are available for sale, then, the secondary will buy the lower priced channel. If both the avalable channels are priced at the same value, then a secondary buys either one w.p. 1/2.
A primary is aware of its own channel state. If its channel is available, the primary decides whether to know the exact state of the channel of its competitor before deciding the price for its available channel. If a primary decides to know the exact state of the channel of its competitor, then it has to incur a cost c 1 > 0. We assume that a primary either completely knows (at cost c 1 ) or does not know whether the channel of its competitor is available 1 . If a primary sets its price at x and it decides to acquire the CSI of its competitor, then, its payoff is
where c is a transaction cost which is incurred when the secondary buys the channel.
When a primary does not know the channel state of its competitor, then its payoff at price x is x − c, if the primary is able to sell its channel, 0, otherwise.
A. Strategy of a Primary
If the channel of a primary is available for sale 2 , it will take a decision D ∈ {Y, N } where Y denotes that the primary decides to incur the cost c 1 to acquire the other primary's CSI and N denotes that the primary decides not to acquire this information. Then, primary i also sets a price for its available channel. If a primary selects Y , i) it selects a price from an arbitrary distribution function 3 F 1 (·) when its competitor's channel is available, and ii) it selects a price from an arbitrary distribution function F 2 (·) when its competitor's channel is not available. If a primary selects N , then it does not know the channel state of its competitor, so it only selects its price using a single distribution function F (·).
and σ(D, F) is a probability mass function over the strategies (D, F).
The strategy of the primary other than i is denoted as S −i .
Definition 2. E{u i (S i , S −i )} denotes the expected payoff of primary i when its channel is available, and it uses strategy S i and the other primary uses strategy S −i 4 .
B. Solution Concept
We consider a non-cooperative game where each primary only wants to maximize its own expected payoff. We use the Nash Equilibrium as a solution concept.
Definition 3. A Nash equilibrium (NE) (S 1 , S 2 ) is a strategy profile such that no primary can improve its expected profit by unilaterally deviating from its strategy [1] . Thus,
III. RESULTS We now discuss the main results:
• Theorem 1 shows that regardless of the cost c 1 , there is no NE where both the players have full knowledge of each other's channel states w.p. 1.
• Theorem 2 shows that there is no NE where one primary has the complete knowledge of the channel state of its competitor, but the other does not.
• Theorem 3 shows that when c 1 ≥ q(v −c)(1−q), then there exists a unique NE where both the primaries select N w.p. 1. The above theorem entails that if c 1 is high, then in an NE the primaries always prefer to remain uninformed of the channel states of their competitors.
• Theorem 4 reveals that when c 1 < q(v − c)(1 − q), there exists a unique NE where primaries randomize between Y and N . Specifically, each primary has the complete CSI of other w.p. p (0 < p < 1). The primaries tend to select Y with higher probability (p increases) as c 1 decreases.
• Theorems 3 and 4 show that the expected payoff that a primary attains in any NE strategy profile is (v − c)(1 − q). Thus, the provision of selecting Y and the cost c 1 do not impact the expected payoff of a primary. When c 1 decreases, the primary(say, 1) selects Y with a higher probability, the other primary (say 2) selects lower price when it selects Y and the channel of primary 1 is available. Thus, in response the primary 1 itself has to select a lower price when it selects Y and the channel of primary 2 is available which nullifies the advantage of selecting Y . We now describe the results in details. We first state some price distributions φ(·) and ψ(·) which we use throughout.
A. Does there exist an NE where both primaries select Y ? Theorem 1. There is no Nash equilibrium where both the primaries choose Y w.p. 1.
Outline of the proof : Assume both players choose Y , so that they know each other's channel state. Thus, the competition becomes similar to Bertrand Competition [1] , i.e. if the channel of its competitor is unavailable, then the primary will set its price at the v, otherwise it will set its price at the lowest value c. Now, the probability with which the channel of a primary is available is q. Thus, the expected payoff of a player is
Now consider the following unilateral deviation for a primary: Primary 1 selects N and sets its price at v w.p. 1. The channel of primary 1 will be bought when the channel of primary 2 is not available for sale. Since primary 1 decides not to incur the cost c 1 , thus, its expected payoff is (v − c)(1 − q). This is strictly higher than (5). Hence, the strategy profile can not be an NE. The above theorem means that there will be at least one primary which will be unaware of its competitor's channel state with a non-zero probability.
B. Does there exist an NE where one selects
First, we provide the intuition behind the result. The primary (say, 1) which selects Y tends to select lower prices with higher probability when it knows that the channel of the other primary is available. Thus, in response the primary 2 (which selects N ) selects higher prices with higher probabilities in order to gain a high payoff in the event that the channel of primary 1 is unavailable since it knows that its probability of selling is very low in the event that the channel of primary 1 is available. The primary 1 can then gain a higher payoff by selecting N and higher prices as it does not have to incur the cost c 1 . Hence, the primary 1 has an incentive to deviate from its own strategy. The detailed proof is given below.
Proof
and calculate the expected payoff of primary 1, subsequently, we show that primary 1 has an incentive to deviate.
When primary 1 knows that the channel of primary 2 is not available, then primary 1 will be able to sell its channel at the highest possible price, thus, it will select v w.p. 1 and its payoff if (v − c) − c 1 . The above event occurs w.p. 1 − q. Now, we consider the case when the channel of primary 2 is available. While deciding its price, primary 2 only knows that the channel of primary 1 is available w.p. q. However, while selecting its price primary 2 knows that the primary 1 will know the channel state of primary 2 if the channel of primary 1 is available. Hence, when primary 1 knows that the channel of primary 2 is available, then the pricing decision becomes equivalent to the setting where primary 1 knows that the channel of primary 2 is available w.p. 1 and primary 2 knows that the channel of primary 1 is available w.p. q. The NE pricing strategy in the last setting has been studied in [3] and using Theorem 2 in [3] we have Lemma 1. Primary 1 must select its price according to φ(·) (given in (2)) and primary 2 must select its price according to ψ(·) (given in (3)).
By Lemma 1 when the channel of primary 2 is available for sale, then expected payoff of primary 1 at anyp ≤ x < v
At x <p, the payoff of primary will be strictly less than the expression in (6). On the other hand at v, primary 1 will get strictly a lower payoff compared to the payoff at a price just below v since ψ(·) has a jump at v. Hence, the maximum expected payoff to primary 1 in this case is (v −c)(1−q)−c 1 . Thus, the expected payoff of primary 1 is
Now, we show that if primary 1 selects N , then the primary can achieve strictly higher payoff. For x ∈ [p, v), the expected payoff of primary 1 at N is
Thus, for every positive c 1 there exists a small enough > 0 such that at x = (v − c − ), it will attain strictly higher payoff than (7). Hence, if primary 1 selects N and the price v − w.p. 1 then primary 1 attains a strictly higher payoff. The result follows.
C. Does there exist an NE where both primaries select N ? Theorem 3. Suppose that each primary selects the strategy (N, φ) (φ(·) is given in (2)). The above strategy profile is the unique NE when c 1 ≥ q(v − c)(1 − q). However, the above is not an NE when c 1 < q(v − c)(1 − q).
We first provide an intuition. When c 1 is high, if a primary selects Y , then it has to incur high cost compared to the potential gain it will achieve, thus, no primary has any incentive to deviate. When c 1 is low, if a primary deviates and selects Y , then it can gain higher payoff by taking advantage of the CSI of the other primary. Thus, the strategy profile fails to be an NE when c 1 is low. The detailed proof is the following :
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Outline of the proof : We only show that the strategy profile is an NE when c 1 ≥ q(v − c)(1 − q) and not an NE when c 1 < q(v − c)(1 − q). The proof of the uniqueness of the NE is deferred to the technical report [7] .
Note that when both the players select N w.p. 1, then, the setting becomes equivalent to the setting where each primary only knows that the channel of its competitor is available w.p. q. The NE pricing strategy in this setting has been studied in [3] - [5] . From the result, each primary must select its price according to φ(·). The expected payoff that a primary attains in the strategy profile is (v − c) (1 − q) . Now, we show that if c 1 ≥ q(v − c)(1 − q) then a primary will not have any incentive to deviate to select Y . Suppose primary 1 selects Y and so, knows the channel state of primary 2. Thus, it will select v w.p. 1 when the channel of primary 2 is unavailable. The above event occurs w.p. 1 − q. If the channel of primary 2 is available for sale, then, the payoff of primary 1 at a price x such thatp ≤ x ≤ v is (using the continuity of φ(·))
Since 1/q > 1, the expression in (9) is maximized at x =p. Sincep = (v − c)(1 − q) + c (recall from Lemma 1), hence, the maximum possible expected payoff is (v − c)(1 − q) − c 1 and this is attained when primary 1 selects pricep w.p. 1. Thus, the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain by selecting Y is
However, the expected payoff that primary 1 attains following the strategy profile is (v−c)(1−q). Since c 1 > q(v−c)(1−q), primary 1 will not have any incentive to deviate unilaterally showing that the strategy profile is an NE. However, if c 1 < q(v − c)(1 − q), then the expected payoff in (10) becomes higher than (v − c)(1 − q). Thus, the strategy profile is not an NE when c 1 < q(v − c)(1 − q).
Remark: The result shows that when the cost c 1 is high, in an equilibrium both the primaries select N . It is obvious that if c 1 > (v −c), then a primary will never opt for Y . The above theorem shows that even if c 1 ≥ (v − c)q(1 − q), primaries will select N .
D. Does there exist an NE when c 1 is low?
Note from Theorems 1, 2 and 3 that if c 1 is low, then there is no NE strategy where each primary selects either Y or N w.p. 1. Thus, at least one primary must randomize between Y and N when c 1 is low. Now, consider the following price distributions
and
Note that both ψ 1 (·) and ψ 2 (·) are continuous. In the following, we show that a strategy profile based on these distribution is a NE when c 1 is small enough. 
. When choosing Y , the primary selects its price according to ψ 1 (·) when it knows that the channel state of the other primary is available, otherwise it selects v w.p. 1. When choosing N , the primary selects price according to ψ 2 (·).
The above strategy profile is the unique NE if c 1 < q(v − c)(1 − q). The expected payoff that a primary attains in the NE strategy profile is (v − c)(1 − q).
Proof. First, note that 0 < p < 1, only when c 1 < q(v − c)(1 − q). Thus, it is trivial that the above strategy profile can not be an NE when c 1 < q(v − c)(1 − q). We defer the proof of the uniqueness of the NE when c 1 < q(v − c)(1 − q) to the technical report [7] . Without loss of generality we only consider the unilateral deviation of primary 1. First in step (i) we show that when primary 1 chooses Y , its maximum expected payoff is (v − c)(1 − q). Next, in step (ii) we show that while choosing N , primary 1 can also get a maximum expected payoff of (v − c)(1 − q). Finally, in step (iii) we complete the proof by showing that its maximum expected payoff is attained at the given strategy.
i) Suppose that primary 1 selects Y and knows that the channel of primary 2 is available. Note that the support set of
. Thus, wheñ p 1 ≤ x ≤p 2 , the probability that primary 2 will select a price less than x is pψ 1 (x). Since ψ 1 (·) is continuous, hence, the expected payoff of primary 1 at x is
Now, we show that at any v ≥ x ≥p 2 , the maximum expected payoff that a primary can get is upper bounded byp 1 − c − c 1 . From the continuity of ψ 2 (·) , the expected payoff of primary 1 at x is now
The supremum of the above expression is obtained at x = p 2 . We can show that atp 2 , the above expression becomes p 1 − c − c 1 . When primary 1 selects a price less thanp 1 then it is trivial that the payoff will be less thanp 1 − c − c 1 . Thus, when primary 1 knows that the channel of primary 2 is available for sale, then the maximum payoff that primary 1 can attain isp 1 − c − c 1 and this is attained at any price in the interval [p 1 ,p 2 ].
When primary 1 knows that the channel of primary 2 is not available, then its payoff is (v − c) − c 1 . Hence, the maximum expected payoff that primary 1 can attain is
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ii) Next, suppose N is selected by primary 1. First, we show that at any x such thatp 2 ≤ x ≤ v, the expected payoff is (v −c)(1−q). At x, the expected payoff of primary 1 is (using the continuity of ψ 2 (·))
Now, we show that at any x such thatp 1 ≤ x ≤p 2 , the expected payoff of primary 1 is at most (v − c)(1 − q). The expected payoff of primary 1 at x is
The supremum of the above expression is attained at x =p 2 . The payoff atp 2 is (v−c)(1−q). Thus, the maximum expected payoff attained of primary 1 under N is (v − c)(1 − q) and this is attained at any x ∈ [p 2 , v].
iii) The maximum expected payoff attained by primary 1 either by selecting Y or N is (v − c)(1 − q). Thus, any randomization of Y and N will also yield a maximum expected payoff of (v − c)(1 − q). At the strategyS, we have shown that the primary can attain an expected payoff of (v − c)(1 − q) both at Y and (v − c)(1 − q) at N . Thus, under the strategyS, the expected payoff of primary 1 is (v − c)(1 − q). Hence, the strategy profileS is an NE with the desired expected payoff.
Discussion: Note from the above theorem that when c 1 is low there exists an NE where both the primaries randomize between Y and N . It is also easy to discern that as c 1 decreases, p increases and as c 1 → 0, p → 1 (Fig. 1) . Thus, when the cost of obtaining the competitor's CSI decreases, then the primaries will be more likely to acquire that information.
Note also that q(v − c)(1 − q) is maximized at q = 1/2. Thus, if c 1 ≥ (v −c)/4, then primaries will never select Y . By differentiating, it is easy to discern that when c 1 < (v − c)/4, then p is maximized at q * = 1 − c 1 /(v − c) (Fig. 2) . Since
Note also that q * decreases as c 1 increases. Intuitively, when c 1 increases, primaries tend to select Y only when there is more uncertainty of the availability of the competitor's channel.
The support set of ψ 1 (·) is [p 1 ,p 2 ] and ψ 2 (·) is [p 2 , v]. Thus, under Y a primary selects lower prices when the primary knows that the channel of its competitor is available compared to the setting where the primary is not aware of the channel state of its competitor. This is because in the former case the uncertainty of the appearance of the competitor is reduced. Theorems 3 and 4 imply that the expected payoff of a primary is (v − c)(1 − q) . Specifically, it shows that the cost c 1 or the availability of the competitor's CSI does not impact the expected payoff.
IV. CAN A PRIMARY HAVE AN ADVANTAGE OF EXTRA
INFORMATION? Theorem 4 shows that both the primaries attain the same expected payoff irrespective of the cost of acquiring the CSI. We now investigate if only one of the primaries (primary 1, say) can acquire the CSI of its competitor whether it can gain more compared to the other primary (primary 2, say).
In this setting, we show that Theorem 5. When c 1 ≥ q(v − c)(1 − q) both primaries select N . Each primary attains an expected payoff of (v − c)(1 − q). When c 1 < q(v−c)(1−q), there exists an NE where primary 1 selects Y w.p.
5 p 1 and N w.p. 1 − p 1 and primary 2 selects N . The expected payoff of primary 1 (2, resp.) is (v − c)(1 − q) + q(v − c)(1 − q) − c 1 ((v − c)(1 − q), resp.).
The proof of the above theorem has been deferred to the technical report [7] owing to the space constraint.
Note that when c 1 < q(v − c)(1 − q), the payoff of primary 1 is higher compared to the primary 2. Intuitively, when c 1 is low, then primary 1 takes advantage of the acquired CSI and gains more compared to primary 2 which can not acquire the CSI of primary 1. On the other hand if primary 2 would can acquire the CSI of primary 1, then it would also do that which will bring down the expected payoff of primary 1 as we have seen in Theorem 4.
V. FUTURE WORK In this paper we consider a simple model in which primaries have the option of acquiring CSI of their competitors. There are many ways this model could be enhanced such as considering more than two primaries (and, multiple secondaries) as well as allowing the channels of the primaries to have different availability probabilities.
